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# BOSS chief's warning: Afrikaners unite, or cut your throats

4 Burke (VIP)  
Decrying the importance of Afrikaner unity and identity and fragmenting people for political purposes could lead to the cutting of the Afrikaner's throat.

This view is expressed by General Hendrik van den Bergh, former head of the Bureau of State Security (Boss), in an unpublished book titled *No Boats in the Harbour*.

A copy of the manuscript was recently acquired by the Independent Newspapers investigative unit, *Spectrum*.

*Spectrum* was told that the publication of the book in America was halted "very abruptly". It is believed that former foreign affairs minister Pik Botha and his department were involved. Botha has denied knowledge of the allegation and Van den Bergh has declined to comment.

The book was completed a decade ago, in 1985, after the introduction of the then prime minister PW Botha's tricameral parliament, and before the unbanning of the African National Congress.

Van den Bergh wrote that the political divisions in white Afrikaner ranks at the time did not bode well for white survival in general.

"I am sure the present dissension in Afrikanerdom is, to a greater extent than most people realise, reducible to a ques-

tion of leadership, leadership personalities and personal modes of leadership rather than one of basic political and ideological principles," he wrote in a chapter titled "The Deadly Illusion: The Road to Afrikaner Diaspora".

"Afrikaner leaders will have to rise above personal rivalries and squabbling over secondary policy issues and realise that the cause of white survival is much more important than settling old party-political scores at the cost of destroying Afrikaner solidarity."

Earlier in this chapter, Van den Bergh wrote that by mid-1983 it was becoming debatable whether the National Party, which had always relied on the overwhelming support of Afrikaans-speaking whites, was really speaking for the majority of Afrikaans-speakers.

"In the Republic of South Africa in 1983 the Afrikaner nationalists were split right down the middle on the matter regarding white interests. Brother was divided against brother, parents against children.

"If consensual decision-making remains elusive within the inner ranks of white Afrikanerdom itself, on what evidence do some National Party leaders predicate their faith in being able to reconcile white and non-white survival

**SPECTRUM**  
MAKING A DIFFERENCE

South Africa's spymaster during most of the apartheid years, General Hendrik van den Bergh, gives a rare - and critical - insider's view of successive governments in an unpublished manuscript obtained by our *Spectrum* investigative team. Chris Steyn reports

needs by means of consensus government?"

Van den Bergh wrote that Botha's view that South Africa's major problem should not be regarded as a white-black struggle but rather as "Christian order" against "Marxist disorder", might have been "good for white politics" but did not address the problems defined by the black community.

"And one of the realities is that the majority of black sophisticates do not subscribe to the white prime minister's political exegesis," he wrote.

The general argued that even in the

TREFWOOI

1 Steyn C

2 Van der

Bergh

3 No Boat in the Ha

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5 Adriek

6 Vreelvelk

7 Duwicks

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9 Polaris

10 Afrika

11 B Ma Pl

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# INSTITUUT VIR EIETYDSE GESKIEDENIS

Die Universiteit van die Oranje-Vrystaat



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early 1980s the ruling elite of the NP had no clear viewpoint on the precise political future of "non-homeland" blacks in the "white" part of South Africa.

"When it came to political rights at national level for the 10 million non-homeland blacks, it was a matter of vague generalisations along the line of 'some form of political expression in some confederal form of government'.

"The procrastination of the 1970s to a great extent emasculated the Verwoerdian plan of action to give a territorial basis for separate political freedoms to the whites and to the blacks of South Africa. It also resulted in the almost frenzied urgency displayed in the early 1980s by Prime Minister P.W. Botha and the members of his ruling hierarchy.

"The result, I am afraid to say, was the creation of a political time bomb..."

Van den Bergh predicted that the real test of Afrikaner unity would come when the pressure of black nationalism on the Afrikaner's critical survival interests reached a point where they would have to make a historic decision on the direction of white-black accommodation.

"It is at this point that there will be a decisive parting of the ways between, on the one hand, those Afrikaners who, as in the case of the PFP (Progressive Feder-

al Party, later to become the Democratic Party), believe that a democratic accommodation of whites and blacks is possible within a single state, and, on the other hand, those who subscribe to the contention that such an association will in the context of contemporary African realities prove to be an infallible recipe for white political emasculation at best and an Afrikaner diaspora at worst."

Van den Bergh noted that events in southern Africa in the early 1980s dramatically brought home to Afrikaner leaders the overwhelming task of trying to secure white survival when previous white governments had failed to come to grips with the realities of the conditions under which that survival was being sought.

He added that, for survival, the implications of demographic realities for the whites, and particularly Afrikaners, were dismal indeed.

"I am convinced that the Afrikaners will increasingly learn the hard way that the historical law that relates national survival to an interplay of population numbers, power and territorium will not miraculously cease to apply in the case of South Africa, thus surprising the world with an instant exception to the historical rule."

## TREFWOC

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*How South Africa trounced the communists, and how the West's thanks was ostracism*

4 Boeke (VID)  
Of all the setbacks suffered by the Soviet Union in Africa during the 1960s, those in South Africa were by far the worst, writes General Hendrik van den Bergh, adding that the country was a target of bitter ostracism from the West.

Van den Bergh was the man who masterminded the police raid on July 11 1963 in which the national high command of Umkhonto weSizwe was captured.

He wrote: "Within three years the vast communist infrastructure, so painstakingly built up in South Africa by Moscow's agents over several decades, had been smashed and radical leaders, both black and white, were either behind bars or in exile. The country itself was on the road to unprecedented economic advancement

and multi-ethnic development..."

However, the general wrote, there lay a deep irony in the Afrikaner's "supreme act of political self-assertion": severing ties with Britain and the Commonwealth.

"While all over Africa the flags of former colonial powers were lowered amid wild scenes of rejoicing and midnight pageantry, the establishment of a republic at the southern tip of the continent was met with a response ranging from cool indifference to undisguised hostility even from many of South Africa's former friends and military allies.

"The white Afrikaner's act of self-determination was seen as little more than a last desperate holding action in the face of the inevitable dawn of black majority rule."

TREFWOC

1. Meyer
2. Van der
3. Bergh H
4. No B
5. in the H
6. Afrikaner
7. Seifbesk
8. Politei
9. Veelval
10. Duitlike
11. Totale
12. aarsto
13. Kammun
14. VID



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# Where Verwoerd went wrong on apartheid, according to the general

*S. Burke (vsn)*  
Former prime minister Hendrik Verwoerd made serious policy errors in the execution of his "separate development solution" to the country's race problems.

This is according to General Hendrik van den Bergh in his unpublished manuscript of 1985.

Van den Bergh wrote that Verwoerd erred in his application of three principles regarded as cardinal for the survival of a society deeply segmented along group lines: the territorial imperative, effective political power, and the numbers factor. For example, the general wrote, Verwoerd thought that establishing industries on the borders of black homelands, instead of inside them, would be enough of a magnet to slow the stream of blacks to the metropolitan areas decisively.

Verwoerd also thought in terms of democratising the black people from the bottom up, "something that simply has not

## NO BOATS IN THE HARBOUR

GEN H J VAN DEN BERGH

1985

### BOOK ONE : THE OUTWARD SURGE:

The coming of the White Africa

*The opening page of Van den Bergh's manuscript*

succeeded so far in Africa. In Africa one has to start at the top".

Van den Bergh added: "What perhaps really went wrong after Verwoerd's death in 1966 was that his immediate successors did not follow up his fundamental breakthrough regarding the territorial imperative and full statehood for the black nations with the necessary urgency of purpose and dynamic action."

TREFWOO

1 *Meun C*

2 *Van der*

3 *H J  
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4 *Meun C*

5 *H J*

6 *Verwoerd*

7 *Van der*

8 *Tuisla*

9 *Fonte*

10 *Beleir*

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# Government 'had most of the features of totalitarianism'

*G. Bocke (M)*  
The defence minister in the Vorster government, PW Botha, came to power in 1978 by way of a well-organised political coup d'état, General Hendrik van den Bergh writes in *No Boats in the Harbour*.

In a chapter entitled "The Survival Imperative: A Seat at the Table", Van den Bergh said the "military option" then implemented by the defence-led government involved the establishment of a constitutional structure that entrenched white control of the system and then afforded a "legitimacy of sorts" for defending the constitution by means of "totalitarian, quasi-military" techniques.

In a passage critical of the PW Botha government, he wrote: "This constitution entrenches ultimate white control of the constitution-changing process of the South African state, while making it possible for the majority white party to seek some sort of alliance with coloured and Asian elites to face up to the combined black majority who are completely excluded from direct participation in the new central parliamentary institutions.

"Parallel to these constitutional changes there has been a much more subtle and hidden development, which has led to the increasing militarisation of virtually all the major facets of civilian government in South Africa.

"This development has taken place on the basis of two premises that in combination have become the *leitmotif* of the white

National Party government, namely the assumption that South Africa is the target of a 'total onslaught' which in turn necessitates a 'total strategy' to defend the security and integrity of the South African state.

"These concepts of course opened the door for militarising virtually all walks of life - it has been stated that even cultural activities have become an integral part of the strategic scene."

Van den Bergh wrote that most of the essential characteristics of a totalitarian regime could to a lesser or greater degree be identified in the white National Party style of governing in the early 1980s.

"The new philosophy and practice of government became dominant when the defence minister in the Vorster government, PW Botha, came to power in 1978."

He added that the South African government and its State Security Council apparatus had an "extremely formidable" military ability and capability to support their "total strategy" philosophy. But he warned that while military and quasi-military regimes were usually very impressive and also popular initially, "it is no substitute for basic ideology and long-term policy".

"Should the present constitutional structure in South Africa begin to suffer severe stress as a result of group conflict, the same regime which instituted it could become regarded as a totalitarian instrument of oppression."

TREFWOO

1. Meyer C

2. Van der ...

3. H.G. ...  
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4. in the Ha ...  
Neelvd

5. Outwiche ...  
B. Ma

6. Totalit

7. me ...  
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8. rauste ...  
Militar

9. ni ...  
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10. U.I.D.



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# General van den Bergh's manuscript

## comes to light

By CHRIS STEYN

*1 Bete*  
An unpublished manuscript written by General Hendrik van den Bergh, former head of the Bureau of State Security, has come into the possession of Spectrum investigative unit.

Entitled *No Boats in the Harbour*, the 483-page manuscript gives the

controversial general's view of key events and individuals in South African politics.

Van der Bergh, who was regarded by many as the most powerful man in South Africa for more than two decades, retired in 1978 leaving behind an intelligence organisation ranking with the CIA and KGB in international notoriety.

When he retired, Van den Bergh opted for the life of a farmer, vowing not to reveal secrets he knew.

The manuscript, completed in 1985, gives the first substantial insight into the thinking of a man whose decisions profoundly influenced South African history.

The book contains criticisms of former Prime Minister PW Botha

and the tricameral system.

It also sternly warns Afrikaner leaders of the time against political divisiveness.

Van den Bergh expressed surprise that we had obtained a copy of the manuscript, but declined to comment further.

See Page 8

TREFWOOI

1. Steyn C

2. Van der

Bergh

3. No Boats

in the Harbour

4. Document

5. NP

6. Veelvoud

7. Ontwikke

8. Militêre

9. Intelligente

10. Staat

11. Levens

12. V.D.